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In 2007 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that US 
companies that had done business with apartheid South Africa 
could be found liable for monetary damages under the Alien 
Tort Statute (ATS) of 1789 (Khulumani v. Barclay Nat. Bank 
Ltd., 504 F.3d 254 [2d Cir. 2007]). Liability arises, the Second 
Circuit declared, from their possible connections with human 
rights violations committed by South Africa during the apart-
heid era. Firms named in the suit include Bank of America, IBM, 
Coca-Cola, and General Motors. The governments of the United 
Kingdom, Germany, and Switzerland all opposed the lawsuit, as 
did the government of South Africa, which argued that the suit 
ran counter to its policy of reconciliation.1 The Bush adminis-
tration also opposed the suit, but the Second Circuit rejected 
the  argument  that  the  cases  could  be  dismissed  for  foreign   
policy reasons.
After  further  proceedings,  in  April  2009  the  Federal 
District Court for the Southern District of New York allowed 
the case to move forward, possibly to a jury trial if not settled 
beforehand. In its earlier decision, the Second Circuit had 
ruled  that  a  jury  could  hold  the  firms  liable  if  they  were 
aware  that  their  business  activities  may  have  substantially 
assisted the government’s abusive practices, even if the firms 
did not intend to facilitate the abuse. “Simply doing business 
1. Curtis A. Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith, “Rights Case Gone Wrong: A 
Ruling Imperils Firms and US Diplomacy,” Washington Post, April 19, 2009.
with a state or individual who violates the law of nations is 
insufficient” to be found culpable under the ATS (Khulumani 
v. Barclay Nat. Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254 [2d Cir. 2007]). But, 
to cite one of the district court’s rulings (In re South African 
Apartheid Litigation, 02-MDL-1499 [S.D.N.Y. 2009]), IBM 
could be held liable for selling computers and software that 
the government used to register and segregate citizens. 
The ATS states: “The district courts shall have original 
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, 
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the 
United States.” Apart from its brevity, four important points 
should be noted about the ATS:
n  The act authorizes civil suits for tort claims brought by 
alien plaintiffs, not by US citizens.
n  The class of potential defendants includes not only US 
citizens  and  corporations,  but  also  foreign  citizens  and 
corporations so long as they are subject to US jurisdiction 
(for  example,  because  they  do  business  in  the  United 
States).
n  The cause of action cited in an ATS suit must be grounded 
on a violation either of the “law of nations” or a US treaty.
n  There is no territorial limit on the cause of action: It could 
occur in the United States, in the Congo, in China, in the 
deep sea, or in outer space. 
Treaties constitute a growing but defined body of law. The 
“law of nations” is a very different animal. In 1789, the types of 
conduct that violated the law of nations were very limited: for 
example, trampling on the rights of ambassadors or engaging 
in piracy. The core legal question today is whether, for ATS 
purposes, violations of the law of nations were frozen in time 
in 1789, or whether that clause can be elastically expanded by 
the federal courts. This question was not resolved for nearly 
200 years. In Filartiga v. Pena-Irala (630 F.2d 876, 879 [2d 
Cir. 1980]) the Second Circuit Court of Appeals allowed a 
suit filed by relatives of a Paraguayan kidnapped and tortured 
to death by Paraguayan officials to go forward under the ATS, 
elastically  defining  the  law  of  nations  in  light  of  evolving 
Policy BriefN u m b e r   Pb0 9 - 9    ma y   2 0 0 9

jurisprudence (Hufbauer 2004). Since then, a number of ATS 
claims have made their way to the federal courts. Many were 
dismissed, and some were settled before trial. 
The US Supreme Court did not address the scope of the 
law of nations until Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain (542 U.S. 692 
[2004]) in 2004. In the majority opinion, Justice Souter wrote: 
“We are persuaded that federal courts should not recognize 
private claims under federal common law for violations of any 
international norm with less definite content and acceptance 
among civilized nations than the historical paradigms familiar 
when…[the ATS] was enacted.” Although this ruling suggests 
a restrictive interpretation of the law of nations, it does not 
enunciate  hard  guidance  that  would  preclude  lower  courts 
from opening their doors to a variety of lawsuits. 
No ATS suit against a multinational corporation has so 
far prevailed after a jury trial. Even when plaintiffs are unlikely 
to win based on the merits, however, they are often able to 
negotiate settlements. In the past, many corporations, such 
as Yahoo!, have preferred to settle ATS cases rather than to 
take their chances with a judge and jury. Companies settle 
for three reasons. First, once a jury hears the gory details of 
human rights violations, it is not likely to sympathize with a 
corporation’s claim of noninvolvement. Second, the process 
of discovery in preparation for a full-fledged trial can be very 
expensive for the corporate defendant. Third, Justice Souter’s 
guidance was not clear enough to allow corporate counsel to 
advise clients with certainty whether or not a district or circuit 
court would find that the stated claim amounted to a violation 
of the law of nations. For these reasons, the prospect of an 
ATS action can be costly to companies that invest abroad, 
even for firms that do not violate the law of nations according 
to Justice Souter’s guidance. 
If ATS suits could sharply reduce human rights violations 
abroad, a great many of them might be justified. However, it 
seems unlikely that these lawsuits will have the desired effect 
on human rights practices. Hufbauer et al. (2008) calculated 
that sanctions against foreign governments designed to achieve 
improvements in human rights are successful in only 15 percent 
of cases. Moreover, ATS suits are directed against corporations, 
not governments, and they are often remote in time from the 
offense in question: The apartheid suit is moving through the 
courts eighteen years after apartheid ended. It is uncertain that 
delayed  penalties  will  deter  future  abuses;  the  possibility  is 
there, but the deterrence record of past human rights sanctions 
is not strong. All in all, ATS suits seem no more likely to pay 
off in improved human rights than economic sanctions. To be 
sure, successful suits will put money in the pockets of some 
victims. But ATS suits will also chill investment in non-OECD 
countries, retarding economic growth in these areas. This will 
increase human suffering, not alleviate it. 
Potential  targets  of  ATS  suits  include  US  and  foreign 
firms doing business in countries that account for 5 billion 
people  and  half  the  world  economy.2  These  countries  are 
mainly poor. In 2007 two-way US merchandise trade with 
countries at risk for ATS suits was about $1.3 trillion, and the 
stock of foreign direct investment (FDI) from all sources was 
about $2.7 trillion (see table 1). Hufbauer and Mitrokostas 
(2003) estimated that full-blown litigation could disrupt tens 
of thousands of US jobs related to exports and inward FDI. 
If the plaintiffs prevail in the South Africa case, it will 
open the door for Chinese plaintiffs to sue a host of blue-chip 
corporations that do business in China for abetting China’s 
denial  of  political  rights.  In  addition,  a  potential  wave  of 
litigation carries other hazards:
n  US court decisions will conflict with jurisdictional claims 
of  other  states,  particularly  when  plaintiffs  and  defen-
dants are both foreign and the violation occurred outside   
US territory.
n  They will harm relations with foreign states that are home 
to multinational firms hit with ATS suits.3
n  Court decisions will interfere with the executive branch’s 
responsibility for foreign affairs under the US Constitu-
tion. 
2. Even India, which is generally thought to be well managed, is susceptible 
to human rights litigation. Amnesty International (2008) details a number 
of human rights violations connected with economic development in India. 
In 2008 “unlawful methods were increasingly used” to deal with protests 
against fast-tracked irrigation, mining, manufacturing, and business projects, 
such as a conflict between private Communist Party–allied militias and 
armed supporters of local organizations in West Bengal that spawned a “range 
of human rights violations” including unlawful killings, forced evictions, 
excessive police force, and violence against women.
3. In the past, countries such as France and Britain have used blocking 
measures to thwart US economic sanctions and antitrust actions, passing 
laws instructing their corporations not to comply with US executive branch 
orders and judicial determinations. The same response can be expected if 
multimillion dollar judgments are handed down in ATS litigation.
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In  order  to  avert  looming  ATS  suits,  multinational 
corporations  themselves  should  work  to  devise  a  code  of 
conduct that would both establish minimum standards for 
firms and provide a defense against prospective ATS litigation. 
However, it took two decades after the US Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act was passed in 1977 for OECD members to agree 
on a Convention for Combating Bribery of Foreign Public 
Officials.4 This precedent suggests that a corporate code may 
take years to negotiate and implement. 
In the meantime, the US government should take action. 
The executive branch may be reluctant to press the issue, since 
Professor Harold Koh, recently appointed the legal adviser to 
the State Department, has argued for a broad interpretation 
of “aiding and abetting liability” under the ATS. Accordingly, 
Congress should take the lead and enumerate violations of the 
law of nations that definitively create causes of action under the 
ATS. This enumeration should be patterned after the Torture 
Victims Protection Act of 1991, which allows domestic and 
4. This convention remains poorly enforced (Transparency International 
2008).
The views expressed in this publication are those of the author. This publication is part of the overall programs 
of the Institute, as endorsed by its Board of Directors, but does not necessarily reflect the views of individual 
members of the Board or the Advisory Committee.
foreign plaintiffs to file civil suits in the United States against 
foreign officials who commit torture or extrajudicial killings.5 
In addition, Congress should confer exclusive jurisdiction on 
the US District Court for the District of Columbia and the 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit for torts brought by 
alien plaintiffs for wrongs that occurred abroad.6 Among other 
things, ATS suits have significant foreign policy implications, 
and to allow dozens of federal district courts and all twelve 
circuit courts to hear these cases will detract from a clear and 
unified US foreign policy in this important area.
5. The Torture Victims Protection Act was enacted by Congress to codify the 
holding in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala. 
6. Hufbauer and Mitrokostas (2003) recommended that Congress confer 
exclusive jurisdiction on federal courts (preempting state courts) for all tort 
claims brought by alien plaintiffs for wrongs that occurred abroad. This policy 
brief goes one step further.
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Table 1     US and world trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) with countries at risk for ATS suits, 
  2007 (billions of US dollars)
Country US imports US exports US FDI World FDI
Sub-Saharan Africa
Angola 1. 1. 0.9 1.
Burkina Faso 0 0 n.a. 0.8
Cameroon 0. 0.1 0.1 .8
Central African Republic 0 0 n.a. 0.
Democratic Republic of Congo 0. 0.1 (D) 1.5
Republic of Congo .1 0.1 0. .8
Cote d’Ivoire 0.6 0. 0. 5.7
Ethiopia 0.1 0. 0 .6
Ghana 0. 0. (D) .6
Kenya 0. 0.6 0. 1.9
Madagascar 0. 0 0 1.8
Mozambique 0 0.1 0 .
Nigeria .5 .7 –0.8 6.8
Rwanda 0 0 0 0.
Senegal 0 0. 0 0.6
Sierra Leone 0 0.1 0 0.5
South Africa 9.1 5. .8 9.5
Sudan 0 0.1 n.a. 1.8
Tanzania 0 0. (D) 5.9
Uganda 0 0.1 (D) .9
Zambia 0 0.1 0.1 5.
Zimbabwe 0.1 0.1 (D) 1.5
North Africa
Algeria 17. 1.6 5.5 11.8
Egypt . 5. 7.5 50.5
Libya . 0.5 1.1 6.6
Morocco 0.6 1. 0. .5
Tunisia 0. 0. 0. 6.
Central Asia/Former USSR
Afghanistan 0.1 0.5 0 1.1
Armenia 0 0.1 0 .
Azerbaijan 1.7 0. 5.8 6.6
Belarus 1 0.1 0 .5
Georgia 0. 0. 0.1 5.
Kazakhstan 1. 0.7 .9 .
Kyrgyzstan 0 0 n.a. 0.8
Moldova 0 0.1 0 1.8
Russia 19.1 6.7 1 .1
Tajikistan 0 0.1 (*) 1
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Table 1     US and world trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) with countries at risk for ATS suits, 
  2007 (billions of US dollars) (continued)
Country US imports US exports US FDI World FDI
Central Asia/Former USSR (continued)
Turkey .6 6. .9 15.6
Turkmenistan 0. 0. 0 .9
Ukraine 1. 1. 1. 8.1
Uzbekistan 0. 0.1 (D) 1.6
East Asia
China .1 61 8. 7.1
North Korea 0 0 n.a. 1.
South Asia
Bangladesh . 0.5 0. .
India .9 16. 1.6 76.
Nepal 0.1 0 0 0.1
Pakistan .6  0.7 0.1
Sri Lanka .1 0. 0.1 .5
Southeast Asia
Cambodia .5 0.1 0 .8
Indonesia 1. .1 10 59
Malaysia .8 10. 15.7 76.7
Myanmar 0 0 (*) 5.
Papua New Guinea 0.1 0.1 0.1 .
Philippines 9. 7. 6.7 19
Thailand .7 7.8 15 85.7
Vietnam 10.5 1.8 0. 0.
Latin America
Argentina . 5.1 1.9 66
Bolivia 0. 0. 0. 5.
Brazil 5 1.7 1.6 8.5
Colombia 9. 7.9 5.6 56.
Cuba 0 0. 0 0.1
Dominican Republic . 5.8 0.9 8.
Ecuador 6.1 .7 0.7 10.
El Salvador  . 1. 5.9
Guatemala  .9 0.5 6.5
Guyana 0.1 0. (D) 1.
Haiti 0.5 0.7 0. 0.
Honduras .9 . 1 .
Jamaica 0.7 . 0.7 8.6
Mexico 10. 119. 91.7 65.7
Nicaragua 1.6 0.8 0. .1
Panama 0. .5 6. 1.6
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Table 1     US and world trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) with countries at risk for ATS suits, 
  2007 (billions of US dollars) (continued)
Country US imports US exports US FDI World FDI
Latin America (continued)
Paraguay 0.1 1. (D) 
Peru 5. .8 6.8 .7
Venezuela 7.6 9.8 10 
Middle East
Bahrain 0.6 0.6 0.1 1.9
Iran 0. 0.1 (D) 5.
Iraq 11 1.5 (D) 1.
Jordan 1. 0.8 0.1 1.5
Kuwait . . (D) 0.9
Lebanon 0.1 0.8 0. 1.1
Oman 0.9 1 (D) 5.9
Qatar 0.5 .6 7.1 7.
Saudi Arabia 5. 9.8 5. 76.1
Syria 0. 0. (D) 9.7
Yemen 0. 0.6 0.8 .
Total 90.8 65.6 6.9 675.
(*) = negligible 
(D) = data withheld to prevent disclosure from individual companies
Note: Total US imports are based on US imports for consumption, according to general customs value. Total US exports represent the FAS 
(free alongside ship) value of domestic exports.
Sources: BEA (007); USITC (009); UNCTAD (008).